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General Equilibrium and Welfare
in International Trade
John S. Chipman*
General equilibrium is investigated in the tradition of Cournot, Mill,
and Marshall, as applied to countries rather than individuals, on
the assumption that individual preferences can be aggregated. This
includes the competitive equilibrium of free trade, as well as of
restricted trade resulting from tariffs, analyzed by Marshall as well as
by Johnson. Johnson’s theory of tariff wars is analyzed as an example
of Cournot’s theory of duopoly, leading to a Nash equilibrium in
contrast to the competitive equilibrium of free trade. Finally, the effect
of unstable equilibrium is discussed as presented in recent work by
Wan and Zhou, suggesting a new concept of negotiated equilibrium.
Keywords : international trade, tariffs, tariff wars, multiple equilib-
ria, negotiated equilibrium
Equilibre général et bien-être dans la théorie du commerce
international
Suivant la tradition de Cournot, Mill et Marshall, on étudie un modèle
d’équilibre général s’appliquant à des pays et non à des individus, sous
l’hypothèse que les préférences individuelles peuvent être agrégées. Ce modèle
couvre à la fois le cas d’équilibre concurrentiel avec libre échange et le cas de
commerce restreint par des droits de douanes, analysé par Marshall aussi bien
que par Johnson. La théorie de la guerre des droits de douane de Johnson est
analysée comme un exemple de théorie du duopole de Cournot, conduisant
à un équilibre de Nash par opposition à l’équilibre concurrentiel de libre
échange. Pour terminer, on discute le cas d’un équilibre instable, tel que
Wan et Zhou l’ont présenté récemment, suggérant ainsi un nouveau concept
d’équilibre négocié.
Mots clés : commerce international, droits de douane, guerre tarifaire,
équilibres multiples, équilibre négocié.
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In this paper I consider the general equilibrium of countries in the
tradition of Mill (1844; 1852), Mangoldt (1863), Marshall (1879; 1923),
Edgeworth (1894), Pareto (1895), and Viner (1937). Attention is not
limited to competitive equilibrium, but is also devoted to what is
now known as Nash equilibrium, in particular the equilibrium of
countries imposing tariffs against each other. The key reference is that
of Johnson (1954), whose model turns out to be analytically equivalent
to a model of duopoly going back to Cournot (1838).
I will discuss two different models which can be used to compare
the differential effects of free trade and tariff-encumbered trade on
the welfares of the citizens of two countries. In each case, in order
to simplify, I abstract from processes of production, and assume that
in each country there is a constant rate of production of two goods
per period. Thus the models are all of simple exchange equilibrium.
In each case I examine a tariff-encumbered equilibrium in which the
two countries engage in a tariff war along the lines of Johnson’s (1954)
seminal contribution. The outcome of the tariff war, which is a Nash
equilibrium, is compared with that (or those) of free trade, which are
competitive equilibria. A third concept of negotiated equilibrium is
suggested.
In section 1, I assume that consumers within and as between
countries have the same homothetic (hence aggregable) preferences of
the Millian or “Cobb-Douglas’’ type, in which the ratio of expenditure
on each of the two commodities to income is constant (in fact, in
this application, one-half). While I consider a general model of fixed
production, in order to make efficient comparisons I assume that each
country produces 1 unit of its import good and ω > 1 units of its
export good per period. In a tariff war between them it turns out
that for each country the equilibrium tariff factor is
√
ω, so that the
equilibrium ad valorem tariff rate is
√
ω − 1. For example, if ω = 2,
the equilibrium tariff rate will be 41.4%. This equilibrium, based
on successive applications of the optimal-tariff reaction function, is
approximately achieved in about four stages of the tariff war. Under
these assumptions it is shown that both countries are worse off
after the tariff war than under free trade (that is, under the Nash
equilibrium than under the competitive equilibrium), but better off
under the Nash equilibrium than under autarky. It turns out that the
welfare levels of the countries at the end of the tariff war are slightly
more than midway between those under autarky and those under free
trade.
In section 2, I examine a fascinating recent contribution by Wan
and Zhou (2008), in which the free-trade competitive equilibrium is
not unique, but consists of two stable equilibria and one unstable
equilibrium as in Marshall (1879), the equitable (“fair’’) equilibrium
being unstable and the inequitable (“unfair’’) ones stable. This
possibility is achieved by assuming a zero endowment (rate of
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production) of each country’s import good, and a unit endowment
of its export good, combined with preferences that are parallel (hence
aggregable) with respect to each country’s export good, i.e., exhibiting
constant marginal utility of the export good, leading to each country
having a strong relative preference for its own import good. What
they show is that, for each country, while one of the two stable (unfair)
competitive equilibria is better than the (unique) tariff-encumbered
equilibrium, the other one is (about equally) worse. The cautious
approach for each country is then to choose the Nash equilibrium
rather than run the risk of falling into the worse competitive one, or
else to negotiate a tariff rate in between.
1. Symmetric endowments and identical Millian
preferences
I shall first take up the case of Millian preferences, in which each
country acts as though it maximizes a utility function of the form
U(x1k,x2k) = x1kx2k, where xik denotes country k’s consumption
of commodity i.1 Letting the first subscript denote the commodity











which is equal to its disposable income divided by twice the price
of commodity i on country k’s markets. On the supply side, I shall
assume that country k produces constant amounts ω1k and ω2k of com-
modities 1 and 2 in each period, so that its earned income is p1kω1k +
p2kω2k. Its disposable income will be this amount plus the deficit in its
balance of payments on current account, Dk (denominated in its own
prices), which in this application will consist of its tariff revenues.2
Let us now consider a situation of trade between countries 1
and 2, in which the parameters ωik are such that country 1 exports
1 Cf. Mill (1852, Vol. II, Book III, Ch. XVIII, 122–151; 1865, 124–153). See also
Chipman (1965, 483–491; 1979), Melvin (1969), Harwitz (1972), and Appleyard and
Ingram (1979). The given utility functions constitute a special case of identical
homothetic preferences, allowing one to aggregate preferences within each country
(cf. Chipman 1974).
2 Note that in the absence of saving and capital movements, if country 1 imposes a
tariff on its import of commodity 2, it will have a deficit in its balance of trade when
reckoned in its own domestic prices, even though its trade will be balanced when
reckoned in world prices. This is because the tariff revenues (which we assume to
be distributed in lump-sum fashion by the government to the population) bring
about and thus correspond to an excess of domestic consumption over domestic
production at domestic prices, hence they constitute a deficit in country 1’s balance
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−z11 ≡ ω11 − x11 units of commodity 1 to and imports z21 ≡ x21 − ω21
units of commodity 2 from country 2, and likewise country 2
exports −z22 ≡ ω22 − x22 units of commodity 2 to and imports
z12 ≡ x12 − ω12 units of commodity 1 from country 1, where in
equilibrium the material-balance conditions zi1 + zi2 = 0 necessarily
hold for commodities i = 1,2.
1.1. Derivation of tariff-modified offer functions
Country 1’s trade-demand function ĥ21 for its import good (commo-
dity 2), which is expressed as a function of its domestic prices p11, p21
and the deficit in its balance of trade D1, is defined in terms of its
ordinary demand function h21 by
z21 = ĥ21(p11,p21,D1;ω1) = h21(p11,p21,p11ω11 + p21ω21 + D1) − ω21




where ωk = (ω1k,ω2k).
For any tariff factor T2 = 1 + τ2 imposed by country 1 on its import
of commodity 2 (where τ2 is the ad valorem tariff rate), country 1’s
tariff-modified excess-demand function for this import good (which is
expressed as a function of world prices p1,p2) is defined implicitly by
ẑ21(p1,p2,T2;ω1) = ĥ21(p1,T2p2,(T2 − 1)p2ẑ21(p1,p2,T2;ω1);ω1)
= p1ω11 + T2p2ω21 + (T2 − 1)p2ẑ21(p1,p2,T2;ω1)
2T2p2
− ω21,
where we have used D1 = (T2 − 1)p2ẑ21(p1,p2,T2;ω1) for the tariff
revenues. Collecting terms, this leads to the explicit formula
z21 = ẑ21(p1,p2,T2;ω1) =
p1ω11 − T2p2ω21
(T2 + 1)p2
= p1ω11 + p2ω21
(T2 + 1)p2
− ω21. (1.3)
Normalizing world prices to (1,r2) where r2 = p2/p1, country
1’s tariff-modified inverse excess-demand function r̂2(z21;T2) for
of trade when expressed in its domestic prices; thus, country 1’s budget (balance-of-
trade) equation
p11z11 + T2p21z21 = (T2 − 1)p21z21 = D1,
which states that its balance of trade denominated in domestic prices is equal to
its tariff revenues, immediately implies that p11z11 + p21z21 = 0, i.e., that its trade is
balanced when expressed in external prices.
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its import good 2 is now defined as the solution of the
equation







z21 + (ω21 + z21)T2
. (1.5)
Country 1’s tariff-modified offer function is then defined as
−z11 = F1(z21;T2) ≡ z21r̂2(z21;T2) =
ω11
1 + (ω21/z21 + 1)T2
. (1.6)
An exactly similar formula holds for country 2. Thus we have a
system of Marshallian offer functions
−z11 =
ω11
1 + (1 + ω21/z21)T2
and − z22 =
ω22
1 + (1 + ω12/z12)T1
. (1.7)
1.2. General equilibrium of the tariff-modified system
We note from (1.7) that this system is linear in the reciprocals of the
trades. Then, using the material-balance conditions zi1 + zi2 = 0 for














A sufficient condition for its solution is that T1T2 < ω11ω22/ω12ω21.








ω22(1 + T2) + ω21T2(1 + T1)
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ω12T1(1 + T2) + ω11(1 + T1)
.
For the consumption levels, we have for country 1
x11 = ω11 − z12 =
ω11(ω21 + ω22)T2 + ω21(ω11 + ω12)T1T2
ω22 + (ω22 + ω21)T2 + ω21T2T1
(1.11)
and
x21 = ω21 + z21 =
ω11(ω21 + ω22) + ω21(ω11 + ω12)T1
ω11 + (ω11 + ω12)T1 + ω12T1T2
, (1.12)
with analogous formulas for country 2.
1.3. Optimal tariffs and reaction functions in a leading special case
At this point, in order to simplify I introduce the assumption that
ω12 = ω21 = 1 and ω11 = ω22 = ω, i.e., each country produces ω units
of its export good and 1 unit of its import-competing good, where
ω > 1.
Now if T1 (country 2’s tariff factor on its import of commodity
1) is given initially, country 1’s problem is to maximize its utility
U(x11,x21) = x11x21 with respect to its tariff factor T2 (subject to the
given value of country 2’s tariff factor T1). From (1.11) and (1.12) the
problem is then to maximize
x11x21 =
(ω + 1)(ω + T1)T2
ω + (ω + 1)T2 + T1T2
· (ω + 1)(ω + T1)
ω + (ω + 1)T1 + T1T2
(1.13)
with respect to T2. Differentiating (1.13) with respect to T2 and
equating it to zero we obtain
1
T2
− ω + 1 + T1
ω + (ω + 1)T2 + T1T2
− T1
ω + (ω + 1)T1 + T1T2
= 0. (1.14)
After some elaborate calculations this reduces to the equation
[(ω + 1)T1 + T21]T22 = ω2 + ω(ω + 1)T1, (1.15)
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from which we obtain country 1’s reaction function3
T2 =
√
ω2 + ω(ω + 1)T1
(ω + 1)T1 + T21
≡ (T1),
expressing its tariff factor T2 on commodity 2 as a function  of
country 2’s tariff factor T1 on commodity 1. Because of the complete
symmetry of the situation, by interchanging T1 and T2 in (1.16) we
obtain country 2’s reaction function T1 = (T2). In the special case in
which country 2 does not impose a tariff on its import of commodity
1, i.e., T1 = 1, the formula for country 1’s “optimal tariff’’ factor on its
import of commodity 2 reduces to T2 =
√
ω(2ω + 1)/(ω + 2).4
Figure 1: Tariff-war reaction functions and dynamic approach to
equilibrium. The case ω = 2
3 The idea of a reaction function was originated by Cournot (1838, Ch. VII, 90
and Fig. 2; 1897, 81). The terminology appears to be due to Fellner (1949, p. 59),
who provided an excellent exposition. He also referred to it there (pp. 64, 68n) as a
“Cournot function’’.
4 Following Torrens (1844, esp. 331–372), the first systematic discussion of the
benefit to a country of a tariff appears to be that of Mill (1844), who held (p. 27)
that it “almost always falls in part upon the foreigners who consume our goods.’’
The first formula for an optimal tariff rate appearing in the literature appears to be
that of Launhardt (1885, §17, 85; 1993, Ch. 17, 86), which is based on a quadratic
utility function. The next is one due to Auspitz and Lieben (1889, Book VI, Ch.
80–82, 408–429; 1890; 1914, 267–280), who provided a geometric treatment on the
assumption that the marginal utility of the country’s export good is constant,
followed (1889, 442; 1914, 288) by a formula x · V′′(x) for the optimal tariff rate
(see Niehans and Jäggi 1995, 382), where V(x) is their curve (Fig. 77) of the “cost
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These two reaction functions are displayed in Figure 1 for the case
ω = 2, and may be compared with those depicted by Cournot (1838)
in his Figure 2. They are hyperbolae.
We may now proceed with Johnson’s (1954) dynamic approach to
equilibrium.5 Starting from free trade, if country 1 begins the tariff
war, it imposes a tariff factor T2 given by (1.16) for T1 = 1. Given
this tariff factor, country 2 retaliates by following the same formula
(with T1 and T2 interchanged) for its new tariff factor T1 > 1. We
now show that there is an equilibrium in this game; in fact it is a
Nash equilibrium.6 If there is an equilibrium, then by the symmetry
of the model both countries must impose the same tariff factor. Then,
setting T1 = T2 = T in (1.16) and squaring both sides, we obtain the
polynomial equation
T4 + (ω + 1)T3 − ω(ω + 1)T − ω2 = 0, (1.17)
which has one positive root
√
ω and three negative roots −1, − ω, −√
ω. Thus an equilibrium exists, and the equilibrium tariff factor is
T = √ω.
Now we show that this Nash equilibrium is stable. If country 1
starts the tariff war under conditions of free trade (T2 = 1), it will
clearly set its tariff factor T2 > 1. If country 2 had started the tariff war,
it would of course have done the same. But now that country 1’s tariff
factor T2 has increased, country 2 will choose a lower tariff factor T1
than it would have done if it had started the tariff war, contradicting





−ω(ω + 1)T21 − 2ω2T1 − ω2(ω + 1)
2[(ω + 1)T1 + T21]3/2
< 0. (1.18)
Now that country 2 has increased its tariff factor T1, country 1 will
reduce its tariff factor T2 in the next round. And then country 2 will
increase it tariff factor T1. The two tariff factors will thus converge.
An illustration is given in the table below, where ω = 2,
hence the optimal tariff factor is
√
2 = 1.41421356237. The dynamic
process is illustrated in Figure 1, exhibiting the successive pairs
of exports and benefit of imports’’. The third is that of Bickerdike (1907), followed
by Edgeworth (1908), who provided formulas based on the assumption of vanishing
cross-elasticities (for a discussion see Chipman 1993). The final and definitive one
was that of Johnson (1951, 29), who acknowledged the assistance of J. de V. Graaff.
5 A slightly different approach is followed by Gibbons (1992, 75–79).
6 Cf. Nash (1951). See also Gibbons (1992, 14–21). The concept was derived
independently by Johnson (1954), and of course goes back to Cournot (1838, Ch. VII,
88–100; 1897, 79–89, and Figures 2 and 3). However, Johnson (1954, 148–9) showed
that in general there need not be an equilibrium; there could instead be a limit cycle.
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(1,1),(1,1.581),(1.365,1.581),(1.365,1.431), (1.409,1.431), etc., showing
that the equilibrium is virtually reached in four iterations. Note that
in seven iterations the equilibrium tariff is reached with an accuracy









1.4. Welfare properties of the free-trade, optimal-tariff, and autarky
equilibria
If T1 = T2 = T, the above formula (1.13) provides an indicator of each
country’s welfare in an equilibrium with a common tariff factor T,
which we may denote
V(T) =
(
(ω + 1)(ω + T)
ω + (ω + 1)T + T2
)2
T.
It is of interest to compare this welfare level under three situations:
free trade (T = 1), a common Cournot-Johnson-Nash equilibrium
tariff (T = √ω), and autarky (T = ∞). It is not hard to see that
the optimal equilibrium with equal tariff factors 0 < T < ∞ (which
includes subsidies for the case 0 < T < 1) is the free-trade equilibrium
T = 1. This is seen by differentiating V(T) with respect to T, leading
to the cubic equation
T3 + 3T2 − 4 = (T − 1)(T + 2)2 = 0
which has the unique positive root T = 1.
The following table provides the welfare level of each country for
three values of ω, under the three alternative equilibria.
It may be noted that in each case, the welfare level under the
optimal-tariff equilibrium is slightly more than midway between
those of autarky and free trade.
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ω V (∞) V (√ω) V (1)
2 2 2.1838 2.25
3 3 3.7128 4.00
4 4 5.5556 6.25
Figure 2: The effect of optimal tariffs on trade and welfare under




An illustration is provided in Figure 2 displaying the Marshallian
offer curves for the case ω = 2, where from (1.7) the offer functions
have the form
−zkk = Fk(zjk;1) =
2
2 + 1/zjk
for k = 1,2, j = k







for k = 1,2, j = k
under the common Nash-equilibrium tariff factor T̂ =
√
2. A trade-
indifference curve for country 1 is drawn through the competitive-
equilibrium point (.5,.5); this passes above the Nash-equilibrium
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 2(1) : 15-33
| General Equilibrium and Welfare in International Trade 25
point (.24,.24) (where from (1.10) we have z12 = z21 = 2/(4 + 3
√
2) =
.24264), showing that country 1 is better off under free trade than
under the Cournot-Johnson-Nash optimal-tariff equilibrium (and
similarly for country 2). It should be emphasized that this conclusion
follows from the strong symmetry assumptions we have made as
between the countries; otherwise, as Johnson (1954) showed, one of
the countries could be better off under the tariff-war equilibrium than
under free trade.
2. Free trade and optimal tariffs under symmetrically
disparate preferences and multiple equilibrium
In this section I discuss an ingenious paper by Wan and Zhou (2008).7
They assume that there are aggregate preferences in each of two
countries which can be represented by the quasi-linear, quadratic, and
mirror-image utility functions
U1(x11,x21) = x11 + 4x21 − 2x221
U2(x12,x22) = x22 + 4x12 − 2x212,
(2.1)
where xkk is country k’s consumption of its own export good and
xjk its consumption of its import good j = k. Note that for marginal
utilities to be positive, these functions are well-defined only for x21 <
1 and x12 < 1, which we hereby assume. Note also that they are each
linear in the country’s export good. Thus, individual preferences are
“parallel’’ with respect to the country’s export good (which plays the
role of money: cf. Boulding 1945, 857) permitting their aggregation
into preferences for the respective countries (but of course not for the
world).8
Wan and Zhou assume further that country k produces exactly one
unit of its export good (commodity k), and none of its import good
(commodity j = k). In the notation of section 1 we have ωkk = 1 and
ωik = 0 for i = k.
7 Also the unpublished paper by Yinggang Zhou, “A Tariff Reduces Unpre-
dictability: A Solution to the Tariff Reduction Paradox’’ (2006), Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY.
8 If one replaces x11,x21, and Y1 in (2.2) below by the demands xν11,x
ν
21 and
income Yν1 of the νth individual in country 1, and then averages the two demands
over the N individuals, one obtains exactly the same formulas, where xi1 and Y1








1/N. This shows that the “parallel preferences’’ (with respect to the export
good) can be aggregated over the whole economy, and thus generated by utility
functions (2.1) expressed in terms of these averages.
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Maximizing country 1’s Wan-Zhou utility function U1 in (2.1)

















where Y1 is country 1’s disposable national income, equal to the
sum of its domestic product, which is simply the domestic (and
world) price p1 of its export good (commodity 1), and its tariff
revenues (T2 − 1)p2z21, where p2 is the world price of its import
good (commodity 2) and z21 = −z22 is the negative of its import of
good 2. Since from (2.2) its demand for imports is independent of its
income, its excess-demand function for its import good, expressed as
a function of world prices, is simply




Proceeding somewhat as in section 1, we combine (2.3) with the
balanced-trade condition p1z11 + p2z21 = 0 and the material-balance
condition z11 = −z12 to get
p1z12 = p2z21 (2.4)
(expressed in world prices). Substituting (2.4) into (2.3) we obtain









whence country 1’s tariff-inclusive offer function is
−z11 = z12 = 4z21(1 − z21)/T2. (2.5)
By symmetry, a similar formula obtains for country 2:
−z22 = z21 = 4z12(1 − z12)/T1. (2.6)
Wan and Zhou compute the optimal tariff factors to be T1 = T2 = 2.5.




































(z12,z21) = (.34549, .90451), (.75, .75) (.90451, .34549),
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Figure 3: Optimal tariffs versus free trade under Wan-Zhou preferences
(see Figure 3).9 As has been well known since the time of Marshall
(1879), the first and third of these equilibria are dynamically stable,
but the second is unstable.10 However, under the optimal tariffs (T1 =
T2 = 5/2), there is a single equilibrium
(z12,z21) = (3/8,3/8) = (.375, .375), (2.8)
which is stable (again see Figure 3).
Figure 3 is the Marshallian diagram (Marshall 1879, Figure 8;
1923, 353, Figure 20)—still current in the literature on international
trade—which is similar to the “Edgeworth box’’ but with country
1’s origin at the southeast corner (z12,z21) = (1,0) where z12 = −z11 =
1 − x11 and z21 = x21, hence (x11,x21) = (0,0); thus country 1’s direction
of preference is northwest. Likewise, country 2’s origin is at the
northwest corner (0,1), and its preference direction is southeast.
It is clear from the diagram that the stable free-trade equilibrium
(.905, .345) is inferior for country 1 to the optimal-tariff equilibrium
(.375, .375), being dominated in both components. Of course, the latter
9 The possibility of multiple equilibrium in economics seems to have been first
noticed by Mill ([1852], 1865: Vol. II, Book III, Ch. XVIII, §6), in a passage referred
to by Marshall (1879, 15) who pointed out that Mill “has seen that under certain
curcumstances there may be several different positions of equilibrium of trade’’;
but Marshall objected that “it appears to me that the special example which he has
chosen does not illustrate the general problem in question.’’ (Mill’s analysis in his
Principles built upon his own earlier 1844 work, from which he quoted.) Marshall
proceeded to use his own diagrammatical analysis to illustrate the problem and
demonstrate the possibility of multiple equilibrium.
10 For a phase diagram of this case, see Figure 12 in Chipman (1987, 936; 2008,
216).
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is in turn also inferior for country 1 to (because dominated by) the
other stable equilibrium (.345, .905).
The following table provides information about the welfare
levels of country 1 and country 2 at the three stable equilibrium
points shown in Figure 3, where W1(z12,z21) = U1(1 − x11,x21) and
W2(z12,z21) = U2(x12,1 − x22).
Equilibrium (z12,z21) W1(z12,z21) W2(z12,z21)
SE free trade (.90451, .34549) 1.23872 2.63627
Johnson-Nash (.375, .375) 1.84375 1.84375
NW free trade (.34549, .90451) 2.63627 1.23872
Starting from the stable optimal-tariff equilibrium (.375, .375),
which affords welfare levels of 1.84375 for both countries, and
faced with the option of free trade, policy makers in country 1 are
confronted with the risk of moving to the stable free-trade equilibrium
(.90451, .34549) with an inferior welfare level of 1.23872, or moving to
the other stable free-trade equilibrium (.34549, .90451) with a superior
welfare level of 2.63627. If these policy-makers are minimaxers, they
will choose to remain in their Johnson-Nash equilibrium (.375, .375)
(see Figure 3). If they are Bayesians, and if they consider the two
stable free-trade equlibria to be equally likely a priori, then since
the expected utility is 1.937495 they will take a chance on free trade,
provided the given numerical utility function correctly reflects their
risk preferences. However, if instead one replaces W1(z12,z22) by its
(natural) logarithm, the expected utility of free trade will be less
than the utility of protection. And it is not as if the policy-makers
could choose free trade one year and optimal tariffs the next; they
must consider a succession of years under the same free-trade
equilibrium versus a succession of years under the same optimal-tariff
equilibrium.
An interesting policy proposal made by Wan and Zhou is for the
countries to negotiate a common tariff that is less than that of the
Cournot-Johnson-Nash equilibrium (and thus closer to free trade), but
still large enough to rule out multiple equilibria.
All in all, this contribution may be considered as a fascinating
and impressive achievement. It would provide an ideal basis for
international negotiation of tariff reduction, provided the model fits
the data precisely. But this question of its realism and relevance
requires some discussion.
I start with the question of the basis for international trade, which
has long been considered to be comparative advantage in some sense.
That doctrine is based on the premise that the main basis for trade is
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relative differences in resources and factor endowments, as opposed
to differences in tastes. Houthakker (1957), in examining the reasons
for differing consumption patterns in different countries, came to
the conclusion that these differences could be explained largely by
differences in relative prices, i.e., the higher consumption of pork
relative to beef in Germany in comparison with France could be
explained by differences in their relative prices in the two countries
in that period, rather than by differences in tastes.11
On the other hand, both the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin
explanations of trade patterns are based entirely on differences either
in “climate’’ or in resource endowments. True, for the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem to hold, one must make stringent assumptions about
preferences, namely that they are identical and homothetic within and
between countries (Chipman 1987, 938; 2008, 218). These assumptions
are undoubtedly unrealistic; indeed, homotheticity of preferences
violates Engel’s law. And there are convincing examples of changes
in trade patterns that reflect differences in relative demands resulting
from different income levels and Engel’s law (Minabe 1966, 1205).
But in the Wan-Zhou model, one must have both different
endowments and different preferences, acting in concert. Given the
demand functions (2.2), at unitary relative prices we have x11 = 1/4
and x21 = 3/4 in country 1, and likewise x12 = 3/4 and x22 = 1/4 in
country 2, indicating very different consumption patterns, with each
country exhibiting a strong relative preference for its import good.12
And the model has each country producing only its export good
and no import-competing goods. This appears to remove the main
political force behind tariff protection. This latter assumption has
been somewhat relaxed in Zhou (2006) (see footnote 7 above), but the
combined force of the two assumptions remains.
In the literature on international trade, there has been much
attention devoted to comparison of free trade and autarky, but very
little until recently to comparison of free trade and restricted or
tariff-encumbered trade. The importance of multiple equilibrium
to the latter has now been demonstrated by Wan and Zhou. But
remarkably, in the literature on general equilibrium there has been
very little attention paid to it. The standard result that one finds in
the literature is that of Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959, 89–90), who
proved that a sufficient condition for general exchange equilibrium to
be unique is that commodities be gross substitutes in consumption
11 Of course, this assumes that either transport costs or trade impediments are
present to cause these differences in relative prices, contrary to the model being
presented here.
12 This contrasts with the situation under CES preferences (cf. Chipman 2010) in
which multiple equilibrium requires each country to have a relative preference for
its own export good. The Wan-Zhou result is also an exception to Mas-Colell’s rule
(1991, 285) that “uniqueness is more likely in models that generate a large volume
of trade.’’
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(Metzler 1945): that is, that a rise in the price of one commodity should
lead to a rise in the excess demands for all the other commodities.13
This result followed from the proof of uniqueness in Wald (1936,
652–6; 1961, 383–7), which I discussed in Chipman (1965, 725–7;
2008, 86–8) in relation to the application of Wald’s condition to the








, where σ > 0 is the
constant elasticity of substitution. Wald’s sufficient condition for
uniqueness in this case reduces to σ > 1. This is a very stringent
condition! But it is by no means necessary, since it turns out that
in a two-agent mirror-image pure-exchange economy in which both
agents have CES utility functions with σ > 12 , competitive equilibrium
is necessarily unique; and even if σ≦ 12 , multiple equilibrium is
extremely rare, requiring consumers in each country to have a very
high relative preference for its export good. I discuss this in detail in
Chipman (2010, Theorem 2, 136).
There are many ways in which the model presented here could be
improved. In particular, it would be desirable to allow for variable
production as represented by supply (“Rybczynski’’) functions yij =
ŷij(p1,p2;Lj,Kj) expressing the output of commodity i in country j
as a function of the world prices and the endowments of labor Lj
and capital Kj in country j; cf. Rybczynski (1955), Chipman (1987,
931–2; 2008, 203–6). Still a further relaxation of assumptions could
be provided by allowing separate preferences for labor and capital
in each country, as in Johnson (1959; 1960). Such a model would
undoubtedly provide wide scope for multiple world equilibrium, yet
still retain enough structure to give rise to interesting results.
References
Dennis, R., and James C. Ingram. 1979. A Reconsideration of
the Additions to Mill’s ‘Great Chapter’. History of Political
Economy 11(4) (Winter), 459-476. Further Thoughts on Mill’s `Great
Chapter’, 500–504.
Arrow, Kenneth J., H. D. Block, and Leonid Hurwicz. 1959. On the
Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, II. Econometrica, 27(1)
(January), 82-109.
Arrow, Kenneth J. and Frank H. Hahn. 1971. General Competitive
Analysis. San Francisco: Holden-Day, Inc., and Edinburgh: Oliver
& Boyd.
13 An alternative but hard-to-interpret sufficient condition has been proposed by
Arrow and Hahn (1971, 211).
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 2(1) : 15-33
| General Equilibrium and Welfare in International Trade 31
Auspitz, Rudolf, and Richard Lieben. [1889] 1914. Untersuchungen
über die Theorie des Preises. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot.
French translation, Recherches sur la théorie du prix, 2 vols. Paris:
M. Giard & É. Brière.
Auspitz, Rudolf, and Richard Lieben. 1890. Correspondance. Revue
d’économie politique, 4 (November-December), 599-605.
Bickerdike, Charles F. 1907. Review of Protective and Preferential Import
Duties, by A. C. Pigou. Economic Journal, 17 (March), 98-102.
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1945. The Concept of Economic Surplus.
American Economic Review, 35(5) (December), 851-869.
Chipman, John S. 1965. A Survey of the Theory of International Trade,
Parts 1 and 2. Econometrica, 33(3 and 4), 477-519, 685–760. Reprinted
in Chipman (2008, 3–121).
Chipman, John S. 1974. Homothetic Preferences and Aggregation.
Journal of Economic Theory, 8(1) (May), 26-38.
Chipman, John S. 1979. Mill’s ‘Superstructure’: How Well Does It
Stand Up? History of Political Economy, 11(4) (Winter), 477-500.
Chipman, John S. 1987. International Trade. In The New Palgrave: A
Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 2 (London: The Macmillan Press),
922-955. Revised version in Chipman (2008, 183-259).
Chipman, John S. 1993. Bickerdike’s Theory of Incipient and Optimal
Tariffs. History of Political Economy, 25(3), 461-492.
Chipman, John S. 2008-2009. The Theory of International Trade, 2 vols.
Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Chipman, John S. 2010. Multiple Equilibrium under CES Preferences.
Economic Theory, 45(1-2) (October), 129-145.
Cournot, Antoine-Augustin. [1838] 1897. Recherches sur les principes
mathématiques de la théorie des richesses. Paris: Chez L. Hachette.
Reprinted, with an Introduction and Notes by Georges Lutfalla,
and Notes by Léon Walras, Joseph Bertrand, and Vilfredo Pareto,
Paris: Marcel Rivière & Cie, 1938. English translation, Researches into
the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. New York: The
Macmillan Company.
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. [1894] 1925a. Theory of International
Values. Economic Journal, 4 (March, September, December), 35-50,
424-443, 606-639. Revised version reprinted in Papers Relating to
Political Economy. London: Macmilland Co., Limited. Vol. II, 3-60.
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. [1908] 1925b. Appreciations of Mathe-
matical Theories, III. Economic Journal, 18 (September), 392-403.
Reprinted as Bickerdike’s Theory of Incipient Taxes and Customs
Duties, in Papers Relating to Political Economy, Vol. II, 340-366.
Fellner, William. 1949. Competition Among the Few. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf.
Gibbons, Robert. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 2(1) : 15-33
32 John S. Chipman |
Harwitz, Mitchell. 1972. A Note on Professor Chipman’s Version of
Mill’s Law of International Value. Journal of International Economics,
2(2) (May), 181-8.
Houthakker, Hendrik S. 1957. An International Comparison of
Household Expenditure Patterns, Commemorating the Centenary
of Engel’s Law. Econometrica, 25(4) (October), 532-551.
Johnson, Harry G. 1951. Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue
Tariffs. Review of Economic Studies, 19(1), 28-35.
Johnson, Harry G. 1954. Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation. Review of
Economic Studies, 21(2), 142-153.
Johnson, Harry G. 1959. International Trade, Income Distribution, and
the Offer Curve. Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies,
27(3) (September), 241-260.
Johnson, Harry G. 1960. International Trade, Income Distribution,
and the Effects of Tariffs. Manchester School of Economic and Social
Studies, 28(3) (September), 215-242.
Launhardt, Wilhelm [1885] 1993. Mathematische Begründung der
Volkswirthschaftslehre. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann.
English translation: Mathematical Principles of Economics. Aldershot,
Hants, UK and Brookfield, VT, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Mangoldt, Hans von [1863] 1975. Von der Gleichung der in-
ternationaler Nachfrage, Annotation II to Grundriß der Volk-
swirthschaftslehre, Stuttgart: Verlag von J. Engelhorn, 185-224
(republished, Farnborough Hants, England, Gregg Press Limited,
1968). English translation by Siegfried Schach: On the Equation
of International Demand, Journal of International Economics, 5(1),
55-97.
Marshall, Alfred [1879] 1949. The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade and
The Pure Theory of Domestic Values, privately published. London:
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Marshall, Alfred. 1923. Money Credit & Commerce. London: Macmillan
& Co. Limited.
Mas-Colell, Andreu. 1991. On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Once Again. In William Barnett, et al., Equilibrium Theory and
Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 275-296.
Melvin, James R. 1969. Mill’s Law of International Value. Southern
Economic Journal, 36(2), 107-116.
Metzler, Lloyd A. 1945. Stability of Multiple Markets: The Hicks
Conditions. Econometrica, 13(4) (October), 277-292.
Mill, John Stuart. 1844. Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political
Economy. London: John W. Parker.
Mill, John Stuart [1852] 1865. Principles of Political Economy with Some
of their Applications to Social Philosophy, 2 vols. 3rd edition, London:
Parker and Co. 6th edition, London: Longman, Green, Longman,
Roberts and Green.
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 2(1) : 15-33
| General Equilibrium and Welfare in International Trade 33
Minabe, Nabuo. 1966. The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem, the Leontief
Paradox, and Patterns of Economic Growth. American Economic
Review, 56(5) (December), 1193-1211.
Nash, John F. Jr. 1950. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1) (January), 48-49.
Niehans, Jürg, and Stefan Jäggi. 1995. Auspitz and Lieben: The
Appendices. History of Political Economy, 27(3) (Summer), 365-386.
Pareto, Vilfredo [1895] 2008. Teoria matematica del commercio
internazionale. Giornale degli Economisti [2], 10 (April), 476-498.
English translation: Mathematical Theory of International Trade.
Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 67 (December),
405-424.
Rybczynski, Tad M. 1955. Factor Endowment and Relative Commod-
ity Prices. Economica, N.S., 22 (November), 336-341.
Torrens, Robert 1844. The Budget. On Commercial and Colonial Policy.
London: Smith, Elder & Co.
Viner, Jacob. 1937. Studies in the Theory of International Trade. New York:
Harper & Brothers, Publishers. Reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley
Publishers, Clifton, N.J., 1975.
Wald, Abraham [1936] 1951. Über einige Gleichungssysteme der
mathematischen Ökonomie. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 7
(No. 5), 637-670. English translation: On Some Systems of Equa-
tions of Mathematical Economics. Econometrica, 19(4) (October),
368-403.
Wan, Henry Y. Jr., and Zhou, Yinggang. 2008. Trade Liberalization as a
Game of Decision Under Uncertainty. In Binh Tran-Nam, Ngo Van
Long, and Makoto Tawada (eds.), Globalization and Emerging Issues
in Trade Theory and Policy. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing
Limited. 15-28.
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 2(1) : 15-33
